9 min read
How credential stuffing works and what stops it
Credential stuffing turns other sites' leaks into logins for yours. How the attacks run, why lockouts and CAPTCHAs fall short, and the defences that work.
By BreachDetect Research
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Credential stuffing is how a breach at one company becomes stolen accounts at another. An attacker takes email and password pairs that leaked somewhere else and tries them on your sign-in page. Nothing on your side has to be broken. It works because people reuse passwords, and it works at scale because the whole thing is automated and cheap.
For most consumer websites it's the attack they'll see more than any other. In January 2022 the New York Attorney General's office published the results of an investigation in which it had found credentials for more than 1.1 million customer accounts at 17 well-known companies, mostly online retailers, restaurant chains and food delivery services. Most of the attacks "had not previously been detected." The office's view was that credential stuffing attacks "have become so prevalent that they are, for most businesses, unavoidable."
So the useful question isn't whether your site will be targeted. It's how many of the attempts succeed, and what an attacker can do once they're in.
How an attack runs
A typical attack needs four things.
- A list of logins. Attackers call these combolists, one email address and password per line. Newer ones also include the website each login was used on, a format known as URL:login:password or ULP. Most of today's lists are cut down from stealer logs, the files infostealer malware takes off infected computers. SpyCloud found that 51% of the combolist records it examined for its 2026 Identity Exposure Report also appeared in stealer logs.
- A config for your site. Tools like OpenBullet run a config file that describes one site's sign-in: which address to send the login to, what a successful login looks like, and what to collect from the account afterwards, such as a points balance or a card on file. Configs for popular sites are traded in Telegram channels. Trend Micro found them selling for $5 to $10 in 2021. Kasada has seen prices from nothing up to $1,000.
- Proxies. Each attempt goes out through a different IP address, usually a residential proxy, so it looks like a person on a home broadband line. F5 Labs calls residential proxies "a must-have for bot operators."
- A CAPTCHA solver. If your sign-in page shows a CAPTCHA, the tool passes it to a solving service. 2Captcha's price list this month is $1 to $2.99 per thousand reCAPTCHA v2 solves.
The tool works through the list, usually trying each account once. Most attempts fail. F5 Labs puts the usual success rate at 0.1% to 2%. That sounds small until you do the sum. A list of a million logins for your site gives an attacker somewhere between 1,000 and 20,000 working accounts, for the price of some proxy bandwidth.
What happens next depends on what your accounts hold. Accounts with stored cards get used to buy things. Gift card and loyalty balances get drained. Accounts with personal data get scraped. Many are simply sold. The US Department of Justice said the people behind the 2022 attack on DraftKings sold access to accounts through online "shops", and Roku accounts taken over in 2024 were reportedly sold for about 50 cents each.
Why it works so well
Password reuse is the whole business model. For its 2025 Data Breach Investigations Report, Verizon looked at the passwords saved on 14,742 infected devices. For the median user, only 49% of their passwords for different services were distinct from each other.
Cloudflare measured it from the other end. Across sites on its free plan, between September and November 2024, 41% of successful logins by humans used a password that had already appeared in a leak. And 95% of login attempts using leaked passwords came from bots.
So any site with a sign-in page is taking a steady stream of these attempts. Auth0 reported that in 2024 the median share of login attempts on its platform showing "clear malicious behavior" was 16.9%. For retail and e-commerce it was 22.2%, and on one day it reached 47.4%. Those figures include password spraying and guessing as well as stuffing.
The lists are also getting fresher. We searched 40 large shopping, travel and food delivery sites in November 2026 and found 89,262 customer logins posted for them in a single month. Every one of those lines named the site the login was for, so an attacker doesn't even need to guess where to try it.
Defences that don't hold up on their own
Account lockouts. NIST's password guidance lets a site allow up to 100 failed attempts on one account before locking it. Credential stuffing tries each account once, so it never gets close. A lockout stops someone guessing one person's password. It doesn't stop a list.
Blocking IP addresses. Residential proxies spread the attempts across thousands of ordinary addresses, a handful of attempts each. The OWASP cheat sheet on credential stuffing warns that proxy support in tools like Sentry MBA "may defeat both IP block-lists and rate limiting."
CAPTCHA. At current solving prices it costs an attacker a fraction of a cent per attempt, while every real customer has to do it too. The New York AG's guide rates CAPTCHAs as weaker than other forms of bot detection.
None of these is useless. They raise the cost of an attack and stop the lazy ones. But a site that relies only on them is mostly filtering out amateurs.
What does work
Multi-factor authentication or passkeys
OWASP calls multi-factor authentication "by far the best defense" against credential stuffing. The 23andMe breach shows why. In 2023 attackers got into roughly 14,000 accounts with reused passwords, and through a family-matching feature reached data on about 6.9 million people. When the UK Information Commissioner's Office investigated, it found that only 0.2% of 23andMe's customers had turned on MFA and 21.5% signed in with Google or Apple. "Notably none of those accounts were successfully accessed."
MFA has a cost. Every extra step loses some customers at sign-in, which is why retailers resist making it compulsory. Two middle paths are worth knowing:
- Ask for a second factor only when a login looks risky, such as a new device, a new country, or a password known to have leaked.
- Offer passkeys. There's no shared secret, so a combolist has nothing to try. The FIDO Alliance's Passkey Index, built on data from nine companies including Amazon, PayPal and Target, found that passkey sign-ins succeeded 93% of the time against 63% for other methods. That's an argument a product team worried about conversion will listen to.
Passkeys only help once the password is gone. If customers can still fall back to a password, that password can still be stuffed.
Check passwords against known leaks
NIST SP 800-63B, revised in 2025, says that when a password is set or changed, the site "SHALL compare the prospective secret against a blocklist that contains known commonly used, expected, or compromised passwords." It also says the site "SHALL force a change if there is evidence that the authenticator has been compromised."
The free way to do the first part is the Pwned Passwords service from Have I Been Pwned. Your server sends the first five characters of the password's SHA-1 hash and gets back every matching hash, so the password never leaves your system. It handles more than 18 billion requests a month. 23andMe did have a check like this, the ICO found, but it compared passwords against "only 20,000 passwords collected in 2021" out of a dataset of about 500 million.
A password-only check has a gap. It tells you a password has appeared in a leak somewhere, not that this customer's login for your site has. "Summer2024!" will fail the check whoever picks it. A customer whose unusual password was copied off their laptop last week will pass, because that password hasn't reached the public lists yet.
Bot detection
The New York AG's guide rates bot detection among the most effective defences, and 12 of the 17 companies it contacted had it or planned to. Good bot detection looks at much more than the IP address: device and browser fingerprints, TLS fingerprints, whether JavaScript runs, and how the page was used. One restaurant chain's vendor blocked more than 271 million login attempts over 17 months, according to the guide.
It cuts the problem down rather than removing it. F5 Labs found credential stuffing made up 19.4% of login traffic before mitigation and 6.0% after.
Ask again before anything valuable
The same guide rates re-authentication at the time of purchase as the most effective way to stop fraud once an attacker is in. A stolen login is worth much less if spending a stored card or points balance, changing the delivery address or changing the account's email address needs the password, a code or the card's security number again.
Find your customers' leaked logins first
Everything above happens once an attacker is already at your sign-in page. You can also get ahead of them. The logins in these lists were posted somewhere before anyone used them, and most lines say which website each login was for. If you find your customers' logins first, you can reset them before they're tried.
The New York AG counts this as a detection safeguard, through threat intelligence services that watch "online messaging channels and forums for signs of a company's compromised credentials or accounts." Only four of the 17 companies it contacted were doing it. We've written up how to check if your customers' passwords have leaked, including free options.
How to spot an attack in progress
Credential stuffing looks different from someone guessing one person's password. The signs to watch for:
- Failed logins rising across many accounts at once, rather than many failures on one account.
- Your overall login success rate dropping sharply, because thousands of wrong passwords are mixed in with the real customers.
- Lots of attempts for email addresses that don't have an account with you.
- Correct passwords on the first try for accounts that haven't been used in months, from a device you haven't seen before.
- Customers reporting orders, address changes or points transfers they didn't make.
Regulators now treat missing these signs as a failing in its own right. In August 2026 South Korea's privacy regulator fined GS Retail 12.8 billion won after credential stuffing exposed data on more than 1.6 million users, saying the company "failed to implement measures to detect or block repeated login attempts originating from the same IP address" and missed "a surge in login attempts and failures." The US states' settlement with 23andMe listed failing to address "a massive spike in login attempts."
If accounts have been taken over
- Reset the passwords on every account that was likely accessed and sign them out everywhere. The New York AG's guide says to treat as compromised any account "reasonably likely to have been compromised."
- Reverse fraudulent orders and restore balances before customers have to ask.
- Tell the affected customers plainly what happened. In 2020 Dunkin' paid New York $650,000 in penalties and costs to settle a lawsuit in which the Attorney General said it had told customers someone had merely "attempted" to log in, when more than 300,000 accounts had been accessed.
- Fix whatever let the attack work, or it'll happen again. The North Face has notified customers of credential stuffing attacks four times since 2020.
We've collected what credential stuffing has cost companies so far, including refunds, fines and one bankruptcy.
Where to start
If you run a site with a customer sign-in and haven't done much about this yet, this is the order we'd go in:
- Check new and changed passwords against Pwned Passwords. It's free, and for most sites it's a day or two of work.
- Make sure you can see failed logins across the whole site, hour by hour, and get alerted when they jump.
- Ask for the password or a code again before card payments, address changes and email changes.
- Offer passkeys or MFA, and require a second factor for risky logins.
- Put bot detection in front of sign-in, sign-up and password reset.
- Find out which of your customers' logins are already circulating, and reset those before anyone tries them. Our free account takeover check shows how many there are for your site.
